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Are robots morally culpable? The role of intentionality and anthropomorphism
Sarah E. Sweezy, Shailee R. Woodard, & Rachel L. Severson
Department of Psychology
INTRODUCTION
METHOD + RESULTS

This study examined children’s judgments of intentionality and culpability of human and
robot agents, in addition to the tendency to anthropomorphize.
• Perceiving intentionality for another’s actions can influence moral judgment [1].
• Previous work has demonstrated infants’ ability to differentiate that humans have intentions and
mechanical devices do not [2].
• However, perceiving personified technology (such as robots) as social beings has been evidenced
when the robot is behaving in a socially contingent manner [3].

METHOD + RESULTS
Participants

Conditions

N=63 (46% female)
• 3-year-olds (n=32,M=3.60 years, SD=.58)
• 5-year-olds(n=31, M=5.55 years, SD=.33)

•
•
•
•

Measures

Robot(socially contingent)
Robot (non-contingent)
Human
Control

TOWER TASK

• Participants viewed video of a person building a block
tower, after which the agent (human, robot) knocked the
tower over.
• Participants rated acceptability, deservingness of
punishment, and act intentionality ('on purpose' or 'on
accident').
• 'Culpability scores' were computed as the difference
between acceptibility and punishment.
Figure 3. Mean scores on Tower Task by intention
Figure 2. Mean judgments on Tower Task.

judgment ('on purpose' or 'on accident').
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DUMBBELL TASK

• Participants viewed video of either a human or a robot
(socially contingent or non-contingent) attempting to
pull a wooden dumbbell apart, but failing to do so.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM
• Participants were given the Individual
Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire
- Child Form (IDAQ-CF) [4].
• IDAQ-CF assessed attribution of internal states
(e.g., intentions, thought, and emotions) to nonhuman animals, nature, and technology.

• Dumbbell was placed in front of the participant to see
if they would imitate the intended-but-failed action.
• If children understood the agent (human or robot) as
intentional, they should complete the intended-butfailed action.
Figure 1. Proportion of participants who pulled dumbbell apart (excluding those who did not touch the dumbbell).

*

IDAQ-CF

Punishment

Culpability

.51**

.39**

Figure 4. Correlations between anthropomorphism
and judgments of punishment and culpability for the
robot.
** p = .01

CONCLUSIONS
Three- and five-year-olds viewed a robot as intentional and morally culpable for its actions, and
these attributions were tied to their tendency to anthropomorphize.
• Children inferred the robot had intentions to the same degree as humans.
• Although culpability for the agent's actions was tied to intentionality (I.e., acting on purpose),
children viewed the robot as less culpable than the human.
• Children with greater tendency to anthropomorphize were more likely to judge the robot, but not
the human, as morally culpable.
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